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Abstract
In many equipment manufacturing industries, rms compete with each other not only on
products price, but also on maintenance service. More and more traditional products oriented
rms are oering their customers products bundled with maintenance service (P&S bundles).
In this study, we examine rms' incentive to oer customers products bundling with long-term
maintenance or repair support service in a duopoly competitive environment. When providing
P&S bundles, a rm need to determine the service level (in terms of average response time
guarantee for the service in this paper) to oer and needs to build a service facility to handle
the maintenance service requirements. Based on the analysis of three sub-game models, we
characterize the market conditions in which only one rm, both rms or neither rm will oer
P&S bundles. Finally, we analyze the aects of serval market factors on rms' strategy choices.
Keywords: Service Competition, Queues, Products and service bundles, Product dierentia-
tion.
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1 Introduction
The rapid growth of business is forcing more and more traditional product oriented rms to bundle
their products with maintenance service. Rolls Royce, for example, oers their customers a life-
long car repair service. They set-up a world wide service system so customers' repairing service
requirements can always be processed almost all over the world. For customers, the bundled
service can increase their satisfaction by reducing the burdens of using it. By oering P&S bundles
to customers, rms may increase their market share and (or) earn additional revenue from the
bundled service.
Although rms may benet a lot from bundling products with service, they need to invest
intensively on service facility to process service requests from customers. To make strategic decisions
on whether to oer P&S bundles, rms need to carefully balance the benets and cost incurred.
A number of challenging decisions include: the service level to oer, the price to charge and the
capacity of service facility.
To better understand rms' strategic decisions on service bundling, in this paper we address the
following research questions: First, under what market conditions should rms oer P&S bundles
or just products alone to customers? Second, if it is better to oer P&S bundles, what is the
optimal service level to oer? Finally, what are the eects of dierent market factors on rms'
service level decisions?
We consider a duopoly wherein both rms have the choices of oering P&S bundles which
creates new benet of service for customers but also incurs service capacity cost, or just products
alone. By constructing a game theory model, we examine two rms' bundling strategy choices and
the price/service level decisions. In this paper, we observe the following key management insights:
First, we found that a higher dierentiation between rms' products reduces the service level oered
by P&S bundle providers. Second, due to the economics of scale in service capacity investment,
P&S bundle providers intend to oer a higher service level when the market size is larger. Third,
when there is only one rm oering P&S bundles, it will oer a higher service level and charge a
higher price than when both rms oer P&S bundles. Finally, we found whether rms will oer
P&S bundles or products alone depends on the cost of the service capacity, the attractiveness of
the service to customers and the market size.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the related literature.
We present our model in section 3. In section 4, we analyze the decisions under dierent sub-
games and characterize the main strategy equilibrium results. Several numerical experiments are
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presented in section 5 to examine the impacts of the service level sensitivity, the rms dierence
and the market size in the equilibrium strategies. We conclude in section 6. All the proofs omitted
in the text are presented in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
The bundling problem has been investigated by many researchers from dierent viewpoints. Stigler
(1968) rst discussed the benet of bundling and showed how it could increase prots when con-
sumer valuations for goods were negatively correlated. Based on an extensive review, Stremersch
and Tellis (2002) dened terms and identied two key dimensions in bundling: (1) whether the focus
of bundling is on the price or product; (2) whether the form of bundling is pure or mixed. Carbajo,
DeMeza, and Seidmann (1990) showed that the protability of bundling depends on the nature of
product market competition. Bundling is protable because it reduces the price competition. Chen
(1997) oered an equilibrium theory of product bundling by competing rms, and demonstrated
the potential of using bundling as a facilitating device in a competitive market to help rms to
avoid direct price competition. Furthermore, Nalebu (2004) showed that bundling is an eective
strategy for the bundles provider to prevent their rival with only part of the bundles entering the
market. Research on bundling competition mainly focused on the price competition, few studies
have investigated the service level decision issues on the bundling of products and service. In our
paper, we study the bundling of products and service, as well as the service level decisions.
Our work is also related to the literature of service industry competition. Luski (1976) rstly
studied the competition between service providers in queueing systems. They addressed a duopoly
where each of the rms acts as an M/M/1 system, where customers select their service provider
based on the full price and the expected steady state waiting time. Levhari and Luski (1978)
extended this model by assuming that the cost rates among customers are independent and iden-
tically distributed. However the existence of equilibrium in these models is still an open question.
Chen and Wan (2000) also studied the model of Luski (1976), and showed there exists a price
equilibrium for the basic model with a uniform cost rate. Allon and Federgruen (2007) studied
price and service level competition between oligopolistic rms. They dened a rm's service level
as the dierence between an upper bound benchmark for the standard waiting time and the rm's
actual waiting time. Allon and Federgruen (2008) investigated the service competition in service
industry. Assuming that the capacity cost is proportional to the service rates, they showed how the
competitive behavior depends on the characteristics of queueing systems from the service providers.
Zhang eta: (2009) studied the service level and price competition between two web service providers
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oering functionally the same web services. They analyzed both cases of simultaneously decision,
and sequential-move situation. These papers mostly focused on the service competition in service
industry, and did not consider the service competition in products oriented industry.
As industries are changing from product-centric to service-centric strategies, there is an increas-
ing interest towards the research of service competition in product-oriented industries. Cohen and
Whang (1997) studied the strategic problem of manufacturers who design bundles for a product
which may require maintenance service after sale. They focused on the service competition between
the manufacturer and other service providers. Xiao and Yang (2008) built a price-service competi-
tion model of two supply chains under demand uncertainty. Their result suggested that a retailer's
optimal retail price and service level are negatively related to their rival's service investment e-
ciency. Fan, Kumara and Whinston (2009) used a game theory approach to analyze the problem
of bundling software with a delivery and maintenance service. They studied the price and quality
competition between a SWS (traditional shrink-wrap software) provider and a SaaS (software as a
service) provider and showed that the cost along with quality aect the equilibrium. Kurata and
Nam (2010) analyzed the after-sales service decisions in a two-stage supply chain, where manufac-
turer oers base after-sales service and retailer oers optional after-sales service. They found that
after-sales service plans that are determined to maximize prots do not match optimal after-sales
service levels that can satisfy customers the most. Kameshwaran eta:(2009) studied the problem
of bundling product and after-sales service together in a competition environment. Their game
theoretic model analyzed rms' three strategy choices: oering product only, product and service
independently, or product and service bundled. Their model focused on the price competition and
did not consider the service competition. These papers, with the exception of Kameshwaran eta:
(2009), do not consider the rms' strategy choices on whether or not to bundle their products with
service. Our paper contributes to this stream of studies by considering rms' strategy choices on
whether or not to oer products and service bundles.
3 Model Formulation
We consider a model where two symmetric rms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) are competing in a market
with M customers. Each rm oers a type of products which can be bundled with maintenance
service. We assume that customers are distributed uniformly on a product line of length 1 between
the two rms. A customer's location at the product line is denoted as x 2 [0; 1], representing his
preference between two rms (e.g., relative preference between the car of BMW and Benz). A
customer located at the left end of the product line (x = 0) treats Firm 1's product as an ideal
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product, and a customer located at the right end (x = 1) treats Firm 2's as his favorite. The
distance of a customer's location to the left (or right) end of this line, which is x (or 1 x), denotes
the dierence between the customer's ideal products from Firm 1 (or Firm 2)'s products. Each
customer has only one unit of demand.
Firms can decide whether to oer P&S bundles or products alone to customers. In the rest of this
paper, we use the term "bundles" to refer to "P&S bundles". When oering bundles, Firm i needs
to guarantee that a certain service level will be achieved. Following Allon and Federgruen(2008),
we dene the service level of bundles provider Firm i, denoted as i, as the dierence between
the expected response time Wi and the maximum expected response time W (Wi  W ), i.e,
i =W  Wi. The maximum expected response time can be an industry standard required by law
or a conventional upper bound.
Customers choose bundles or products of the two rms based on the price, the service level of
bundles and their own products preference. Suppose that Firm 1 oers bundles with an expected
response time guarantee W1, i.e, a service level of 1 =W  W1, to customers at price p1. For the
customer at location x, the net utility of buying a bundle from Firm 1 is U +k
 
W  W1
 p1  tx,
where U is the utility for a customer if he gets his ideal product for free (without service), and U
is assumed to be the same for all customers. This utility function is quite intuitive. A customer's
utility is linearly increasing in the oered service level
 
W  W1

and linearly decreasing in the
charged price p1 and the degree of dierence to customer's ideal product, x. k
 
W  W1

is the
customer's utility to the bundled service, and k denotes customers' sensitivity to the bundled service.
When Firm 1 reduces the expected response time W1, the utility increases because a customer's
expected response time is shorter. Note that if the expected response time W1 is larger than or
equals to the maximum expected response time W , the utility for service is 0, which is indierent
from the case where no bundled service is oered. Item tx represents the loss of utility because
of the dierence between Firm 1's products and the ideal products of a customer at x, where t is
the intensity of relative preference of rms. When t is very small. e.g., t = 0, people almost have
no preference between two rms (In customers' view, these two rms has no dierence). A higher
t implies a bigger dierence between two rms. When Firm 1 oers products alone to customers
at price p1, the customer gets no service, resulting to a utility as U   p1   tx. Similarly, when
Firm 2 oers a bundle, or a product alone to a customer, the customer's utility of buying it is
U + k
 
W  W2
   p2   t (1  x), or U   p2   t (1  x). A customer buys a product or a bundle
from the rm that provides him a higher utility. In this study, we consider the case that the whole
market is covered by two rms, and U is assumed to be large enough so that all customers' net
utility are nonnegative and all consumers will buy a product from one of the two rms. The unit
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Figure 1: Time series of events
production cost for both rms' products is assumed to be c.
When buying bundles, customers also ask the for service level guarantee agreements. After the
demands are realized, the bundles providers need to build up the corresponding service facilities (e.g.
the maintenance systems or the IT service support departments) to process the service requirements.
Note that the bundles providers should decide the capacity of the service facilities to guarantee the
service level, i.e. the mean response time for customers' service requirement should not be larger
than the promised average delay. Thus we need to consider the queuing delay and the processing
rate for the service requirements.
Following Tan and Mookerjee (2005), we assume that the customers' service requirements arrival
at Firm i follow a Poisson process with a mean arrival rate i. Notice that a service requirement
is just raised by a customer who bought a P&S bundle. It is naturally to assume that i is
proportional to the demand Di, i.e., i =
Di
n
, where
1
n
is the average usage rate of all customers.
As the processing time of most service are closer to exponential distribution, we assume that the
service requirement processing time here is exponentially distributed. We use the service processing
rate i to represent the service capacity of Firm i. Obviously, a higher service capacity could
provide a higher service processing rate. Following Allon and Federgruen(2008), we assume that
the capacity cost is proportional to the service rates, i.e., each unit of service capacity incurs a cost
of cv. Thus the total cost for the service capacity is cvi for Firm i. We analyze later the rms'
optimal capacity decisions for given expected waiting time guarantees and realized demand.
We consider a four-stage game. The sequence of all events in the procedure is shown in Figure
1. At the rst stage, both rms decide whether to oer bundles or products alone. We denote the
rst stage strategy of Firm i, i 2 f1; 2g, as Si 2 fB, Pg, where B represents the decision to oer
bundles, and P represents the decision to only oer products alone, respectively. We use (S1, S2) to
denote the outcome of the rst stage strategy. If any of them decide to oer bundles, they set the
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service level at the second stage. At the third stage, given the strategy decisions (S1, S2) and the
service level decisions (if applicable), both rms determine the price for the bundles or products
alone. After the the price decision, the demand is realized. At the nal stage, rms determine the
capacity of service facilities (if applicable) to build up. Then all the service requirements arrive
and are processed in droves (if applicable).
4 Equilibrium Analysis
Because each rm can decide whether to oer bundles or products alone at the rst stage, we
analyse the following sub-games induced by the outcomes of the rst stage before analyzing the
overall game strategy: (1) both rms oer products alone, denoted as (P, P); (2) both rms oer
bundles, denoted as (B, B); (3) Firm 1 oers bundles and Firm 2 oers products alone, denoted
as (B, P). (4) Firm 1 oers products alone and Firm 2 oers bundles, denoted as (P, B). In this
model, we assume that two rms are symmetric. Thus it is sucient to just analyze the rst three
scenarios. The outcome of the (P, B) sub-game can be easily derived from the (B, P) sub-game.
Using standard backward induction, we rst consider the rms' service capacity decisions at the
fourth stage.
4.1 Service Capacity Decisions
If Firm i oers bundles to customers, the service requirements and the service facility of Firm i
constructs a M/M/1 queuing system. In this queuing system, the expected waiting time for a
customer's service requirement is wi =
1
i   i . Therefore, given the average service response time
guarantee Wi and the demand Di, the decision problem of Firm i's service capacity is dened as
follows:
min
i
cvi
s:t :
1
i   Di
n
Wi: (1)
It is easy to see that the optimal capacity is as follows:
i =
1
Wi
+
Di
n
: (2)
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When Firm i decides to oer bundles, the capacity cost incurred is:
cv
Wi
+
cvDi
n
. The constant
cost
cv
Wi
is independent to demand Di, and a variable cost of
cvDi
n
is proportional to the demand.
Note that for a given service level decision and a realized demand, the cost of service capacity is
sunk.
4.2 (P, P) Sub-game
When both rms decide to provide products alone to customers at the rst stage, they just need
to determine the prices. From the utility function, we can see that a customer located at x is
indierent between the two rm's products i:
U   p1   tx = U   p2   t (1  x) : (3)
We can thus derive from equation (3) that the customer's location is x<P;P> =
p2   p1 + t
2t
.
Those customers whose locations are at the left to x<P;P>, i.e. x  x<P;P>, will buy products from
Firm 1, and the other customers will choose Firm 2's products. The demand functions of the two
rms are D1 =

p2   p1 + t
2t

M and D2 =

1  p2   p1 + t
2t

M .
Back to the pricing decision stage, two rms determine the price to maximize:
<P;P>1 = (p1   c)

p2   p1 + t
2t

M (4)
<P;P>2 = (p2   c)

1  p2   p1 + t
2t

M (5)
Using rst order conditions for the pricing problem in (4) and (5), we can obtain the equilibrium
solutions in sub-game (P, P), which are presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If both rms choose to provide products alone to customers at the rst stage, the
equilibrium prices are: p<P;P>1 = p
<P;P>
2 = c + t, and the equilibrium prots are: 
<P;P>
1 =
<P;P>2 =
Mt
2
.
In subgame (P, P), both rms charge the same price that exceeds unit production cost c by t.
While t represents the dierence between two rms' products, they can charge a higher price when
t is larger. This is in accordance with the conclusion of prior literature (i.e., Daniel 2001) that the
dierentiation between two rms reduces the intensity of competition. Daniel (2001) showed the
same result in an imperfect competition model. The expected prots of two rms are the same and
increase with the market size M and t. Thus a larger market size or bigger dierence between two
rms will lead to higher expected prots.
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4.3 (B, B) Sub-game
When both rms choose to oer bundles to customers at the rst stage, a customer located at x is
indierent between two rms' bundles i:
U + k
 
W  W1
  p1   tx = U + k  W  W2  p2   t (1  x) : (6)
By solving equation (6), we can derive the indierent customer's location
x<B;B> =
k (W2  W1) + p2   p1 + t
2t
:
Since we are interested in a more general case when both rms are in the market, we impose
a condition x<B;B> 2 [0; 1], which requires the assumption kW  t < 3t, i.e. the dierence
between the two rms is suciently large. Consequently, customers in the interval

0; x<B;B>

will
purchase bundles from Firm 1, while those in the interval

x<B;B>; 1

will purchase bundles from
Firm 2. The demand for two rms are D<B;B>1 =

k (W2  W1) + p2   p1 + t
2t

M and D<B;B>2 =
k (W1  W2) + p1   p2 + t
2t

M .
Given Firm i' expected response time guarantee Wi and price decisions pi, the demand of Firm
i can be identied. From (2), we can see that the service capacity decision of Firm i at the fourth
stage is <B;B>i =
1
Wi
+
D<B;B>i
n
.
The prot function of rm i in the sub-game (B,B) is <B;B>1 = (p1   c)D<B;B>i  
cv
n
D<B;B>i  
cv
Wi
. Given W1 and W2, two rms determine the prices to maximize their prots at the third stage.
By substituting the service capacity decisions into two rms' prot functions and simplication, we
can get:
<B;B>1 =

p1   c  cv
n
k (W2  W1) + p2   p1 + t
2t

M   cv
W1
(7)
<B;B>2 =

p2   c  cv
n
k (W1  W2) + p1   p2 + t
2t

M   cv
W2
(8)
Using the rst order conditions, we can derive the optimal prices as follows:
p<B;B>1 = c+
cv
n
+ t+
k(W2  W1)
3
(9)
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p<B;B>2 = c+
cv
n
+ t+
k(W1  W2)
3
(10)
Now we analyze two rms' service level decisions at the second stage. By substituting (9) and
(10) into (7) and (8), we get
<B;B>1 =
M
2t

t+
k (W2  W1)
3
2
  cv
W1
(11)
<B;B>2 =
M
2t

t+
k (W1  W2)
3
2
  cv
W2
(12)
Using the rst order conditions, we can solve the equilibrium service level decisions. Then
we can further derive all equilibrium solutions of sub-game (B,B), which are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 If both rms choose to provide P&S bundles to customers, the equilibrium expected
response time guarantees are given by:
W<B;B>1 =W
<B;B>
2 =
r
3cv
kM
(13)
the equilibrium prices are given by:
p<B;B>1 = p
<B;B>
2 = c+
cv
n
+ t (14)
the equilibrium service capacity decisions are given by:
<B;B>1 = 
<B;B>
2 =
r
kM
3cv
+
M
2n
(15)
and the equilibrium prots are given by:
<B;B>1 = 
<B;B>
2 =
Mt
2
 
r
cvkM
3
(16)
From Proposition 2, we have the following observations. The equilibrium expected response
time guarantees increase along the service capacity cost cv, but the increasing rate is decreasing.
Thus, as the cost for the service capacity goes down, the bundles provider could build more service
capacity to oer a higher service level or a shorter expected response time guarantee. Besides, the
equilibrium expected response time is decreasing in customers' sensitivity to service level k. As
we could expect, the higher customers value the service, the higher the service level (the shorter
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expected response time guarantee) the bundles provider may oer. The equilibrium expected
response time is decreasing in the market size M . As the market size increases, the xed cost for
the service capacity can be shared by more customers, and thus the bundles provider can aord
to build more capacity and oer a higher service level. Since the service capacity decisions are
determined by the service level and the demand, it is naturally to see that the optimal service
capacity is decreasing in service capacity cost and increasing in market size. While
1
n
is the average
usage rate of all customers, a lower n implies more service requirements, which requires more service
capacity. Thus, the optimal service capacity is also decreasing in n.
To ensure both rms have the motivation to oer bundles, we assume that each customer's utility
for the service is not less than the variable service cost incurred in sub-game (B, B). Specically,
we assume k

W  W<B;B>i

= k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
 cv
n
. To justify this assumption, we check the
rms' decisions in the case of k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
<
cv
n
. Because the utility of bundled service is
k
 
W  W  and the disutility of price is  p, we can see that without reducing customers' utility,
rms would rather cut the price by
cv
n
than to oer bundled service, which incurres cost more than
k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
. Thus rms will not oer bundles in this case.
4.4 (B, P) Sub-game
Suppose Firm 1 oers bundles while Firm 2 chooses to oer only products to customers at the rst
stage. In this case, a customer located at x will be indierent to purchasing bundles from Firm 1
or purchasing products from Firm 2 i:
U + k
 
W  W1
  p1   tx = U   p2   t (1  x) : (17)
The indierent customers' location is: x<B;P> =
k
 
W  W1

+ p2   p1 + t
2t
. Hence, the cus-
tomers located at

0; x<B;P>

will purchase bundles from Firm 1, the customers located at

x<B;P>; 1

will only purchase products from Firm 2. The demand of two rms are as follows:
D<B;P>1 =
"
p2   p1 + t+ k
 
W  W1

2t
#
M (18)
D<B;P>2 =
"
p1   p2 + t  k
 
W1  W

2t
#
M: (19)
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In the sub-game (B, P), only Firm 1 has to invest in service capacity. From (2), we know that
for a given expected response time guaranteeW1 and realized demand D
<B;P>
1 , the service capacity
decision of Firm 1 at the fourth stage is <B;P>1 =
1
W1
+
D<B;P>1
n
.
At the third stage, Firm 1 determines price to maximize
<B;P>1 = (p1   c)
"
k
 
W  W1

+ p2   p1 + t
2t
#
M
 cv
n
"
k
 
W  W1

+ p2   p1 + t
2t
#
M   cv
W1
(20)
Where
cv
n
"
k
 
W  W1

+ p2   p1 + t
2t
#
M +
cv
W1
represents the service capacity cost.
Firm 2 does not need to determine the service level decision and service capacity decision. At
the third stage, Firm 2 determines the price p2 to maximize:
<B;P>2 = (p2   c)
"
p1   p2 + t
2t
  k
 
W1  W

2t
#
M: (21)
The equilibrium prices for a given W1 are:
p<B;P>1 = c+ t+
2cv
3n
+
k(W  W1)
3
(22)
p<B;P>2 = c+ t+
cv
3n
  k(W  W1)
3
: (23)
Equation (22) shows that the price of Firm 1's bundles is decreasing in the expected response
time guarantee. Thus Firm 1 could charge a higher price when a shorter expected response time
guarantee is oered. Equation (23) shows that the price of Firm 2's products is increasing in Firm
1's expected response time guarantee. As Firm 1 provides a shorter W1 (in turn, a higher service
level), Firm 2 will oer a lower price to stay competitive.
Back to the second stage, only bundles provider Firm 1 need to determine the expected response
time guarantee. By substituting (22) and (23) into (20), and simplication, Firm 1's prot function
can be rewritten as :
<B;P>1 =
Mt
2
"
1  cv
3nt
+
k
 
W  W1

3t
#2
  cv
W1
: (24)
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The rst order condition leads to the following equation:
(W1)
2
"
3t  Cvn
k
+
 
W  W1
#  9cvt
Mk2
= 0: (25)
To characterize the equilibrium service level decision, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 If k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
 cv
n
> 0, there exists a unique value for W<B;P>1 2

0;W   cv
kn
i
,
such that: 
W<B;P>1
2 243t  cvn
k
+

W  W<B;P>1
35  9cvt
Mk2
= 0. (26)
Note that without decreasing customers' utility, it is more cost saving to decrease price by
cv
n
than to oer bundled service with expected response time guarantee W<B;P>1 > W  
cv
kn
for
bundles provider. Thus the optimal W<B;P>1 satises W
<B;P>
1 2

0;W   cv
kn
i
. Lemma 1 claims
that there is a unique equilibrium solution for sub-game (B, P). Now we conclude the equilibrium
service level solution in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In sub-game (B, P), there exists a unique optimal solution for the P&S bundles
provider at the second stage. The optimal W<B;P>1 is the unique solution of equation (26) in
[0;W   cv
n
].
The comparative statics analysis results about the eects of various parameters on the the
equilibrium service level solution are presented in Corollary 1:
Corollary 1 In sub-game (B, P), the optimal W<B;P>1 is increasing in t and cv, and is decreasing
in k, n and M .
Corollary 1 shows that in the sub-game (B, P), a higher product dierentiation will lead to a longer
expected response time guarantee. A higher product dierentiation will reduce the intensity of ser-
vice competition, which is consistent with the conclusions in the product dierentiation literature.
A simple examination from customers' utility function shows that k refers to the customer's utility
about service. For a certain service level, a higher k leads to a higher utility to customers, thus the
bundles provider has the motivation to oer a shorter expected response time guarantee. Finally,
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the equilibrium expected response time guarantee is decreasing in the market size M , which is
consistent with the result in section 3.2.
By substituting W<B;P>1 into the expressions of equilibrium prices and prots, we can derive
the other equilibrium solutions of sub-game (B, P), which are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 If Firm 1 oers bundles and Firm 2 oers products alone, the equilibrium prices
for the two rms are:
p<B;P>1 = c+ t+
2cv
3n
+
k(W  W<B;P>1 )
3
(27)
p<B;P>2 = c+ t+
cv
3n
  k(W  W
<B;P>
1 )
3
(28)
the equilibrium prots are:
<B;P>1 =
Mt
2
241  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
352   cv
W<B;P>1
(29)
<B;P>2 =
Mt
2
241 + cv
3nt
 
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
352 (30)
where W<B;P>1 is the unique solution of equation (26).
By analyzing how the equilibrium prices are aected by customers' sensitivity to service and the
unit service capacity cost in sub-game (B, P), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 In sub-game (B, P), Firm 1's equilibrium price p<B;P>1 is increasing in k; Firm 2's
equilibrium price p<B;P>2 is decreasing in k and increasing in cv.
Corollary 2 shows that as customers' sensitivity to service goes up, the bundles provider becomes
more competitive. Hence for a higher k, Firm 1 can raise its price without reducing customers'
total utility, while Firm 2 should decrease its price to keep competitive. As the unit service capacity
cost increases, the bundles provider becomes less competitive, thus Firm 2 faces less pressure and
it charges a higher price.
Comparing the equilibrium expected response time guarantees under dierent sub-games, we
get the following corollary:
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Corollary 3 The P&S bundles provider Firm 1 will oer a shorter expected response time guar-
antee for service in sub-game (B, P) than that in sub-game (B, B), i.e., W<B;P>1 < W
<B;B>
1 =
W<B;B>2 .
Corollary 3 implies that Firm 1 would oer a shorter expected response time guarantee for
service when only Firm 1 oers bundles than the case when both rms oer bundles.
The relationship between the price and the unit service capacity cost at Firm 1 is much more
complicated. We examine it in a numerical experiment (illustrated in Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Relation between price p<B;P>1 and the unit service capacity cost cv
As we can observe from Figure 2, when the unit service capacity cost is below a threshold, Firm
1's price decreases in the unit service capacity cost. However, when the unit service capacity cost
is greater than the threshold, Firm 1's price is increasing in the service capacity cost. This may be
due to Firm 1's consideration of the balance between taking a bigger market share and earning a
higher marginal prot. When the unit service capacity cost is low, it is more benecial for Firm 1
to reduce its price to occupy a larger market, and as the unit service capacity cost increases, it is
much more important to keep its marginal prot.
Comparing the equilibrium prices of sub-game (B, P) to those of other sub-game equilibrium
solutions, we have Corollary 4.
Corollary 4 The equilibrium prices under dierent sub-games satisfy the following relationships:
p<B;P>1 > p
<B;B>
1 = p
<B;B>
2 > p
<P;P>
1 = p
<P;P>
2 > p
<B;P>
2 .
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Corollary 4 shows that in sub-game (B, P), Firm 1's rival could just compete by the price,
while in sub-game (B, B), Firm 1 faces both the price and service competition. As rm 1 faces less
pressure in sub-game (B, P) than in sub-game (B, B), it could charge a higher price. Comparing
to sub-game (B, B), two rms aord additional service capacity investment cost in sub-game (P,
P). Hence, as we could expect, the equilibrium prices in sub-game (B, B) are higher.
Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 presents an interesting result: when only one rm oers a bundle
then they oer a higher service level and charge a higher price. From Corollary 2, we can see that
Firm 1 charges a higher price in sub-game(B, P) than in sub-game(P, P). The marginal prot in
sub-game (B, P)is t  cv=n+ k(W  W1)=2t, which is higher than the marginal prot in sub-game
(P, P)(just t). Firm 1 can earn more marginal prot by increasing service level in sub-game (B,
P). Thus we can expect that Firm 1 may oer a higher service level when only herself providing
service bundles. In auto industry, most of the auto rms providing service bundles are the luxury
car companies, e.g., Rolls-Royce, Lexus. These companies often oer a high level service and charge
a relatively high price.
Comparing the market share of two rms under dierent sub-games, we have Corollary 5.
Corollary 5 The market share under dierent sub-games satisfy the following relationships: D<B;P>1 >
D<B;B>1 = D
<B;B>
2 > D
<P;P>
1 = D
<P;P>
2 > D
<B;P>
2 .
Corollary 5 shows that Firm 1 in sub-game (B, P) got the largest market share. As in sub-game
(B, P), bundles provider are more competitive than Firm 2 which does not provide service. This
result intuitively sounds sense. Corollary 5 also provides an explanation to Corollary 3: when the
service facility cost were shared by more customers, bundles provider may be able to oer a higher
service level.
4.5 Strategy Equilibrium
Now we consider two rms' strategy choices at the rst stage. To analyze the nal strategy equi-
librium, we need to compare the outputs of all sub-games at rst. Let 1 (cv) = 
<B;P>
1  <P;P>1 ,
2 (cv) = 
<B;P>
2  <B;B>2 . Notice that the value of 1 (2) determines if Firm 1 (Firm 2) would
oer bundles or products alone when Firm 2 (Firm 1) oers products alone (bundles). Thus the
nal strategy equilibria depends the value of 1 and 2. Lemma 2 characterizes the value of 1
and 2 over dierent space of cv.
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Lemma 2 Let cv be the solution of k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
=
cv
n
.
(i) There exists a critical value cv 2 [0; cv] such that: when cv < cv , 1 (cv) > 0; when cv > cv ,
1 (cv) < 0.
(ii) There exists a critical value cv 2 [0; cv] such that: when cv < cv, 2 (cv) < 0; when cv > cv,
2 (cv) > 0.
(iii) cv < cv .
Base on this result, we can show the relationship between the value of cv and the nal equilibrium
strategies.
Proposition 5 (i) if cv < c

v, then 
<B;P>
1 > 
<P;P>
1 , 
<B;P>
2 < 
<B;B>
2 . The pure strategy
Nash equilibrium is (B, B) and both the rms oer bundles.
(ii) if cv  cv  cv , then <B;P>1  <P;P>1 , <B;P>2  <B;B>2 . The pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is (B, P) or (B, P), and only one rm oers P&S bundles and the other rm
oers products alone.
(iii) if cv > c

v , then 
<B;P>
1 < 
<P;P>
1 , 
<B;P>
2  <B;B>2 . The pure strategy Nash equilibrium
is (P, P) and both rms oer products alone.
Proposition 5 has important managerial implications for rms making strategy decisions be-
tween oering bundles and products alone. As we could expect, when the unit service capacity cost
is large enough, both rms will not oer bundles to customers. However, when cv is moderately
large, only one rm oers bundles to customers. While when cv is relatively low, both rms oer
bundles to customers, and the equilibrium strategy is (B, B). For numerical example with k = 3,
t = 1, M = 9, n = 10 and W = 1, the eect of changing cv on nal strategy equilibrium is shown
in Figure 3.
The values of cv(k; t) and cv (k; t) in Proposition 5 can be found in Figure 3. When cv > cv (k; t),
1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In this situation, if any rm oers bundles rather than products alone, it will
only earn a lower prot no matter what strategy its rival takes. Therefore, both rms prefer to
oer products alone to customers. When cv(k; t)  cv  cv (k; t), 1  0 and 2  0, if any one
rm oers products alone, the other rm will prefer to oer bundles to customers. Consequently,
the equilibrium is (B, P) or (P, B). When cv < c

v(k; t), if any rm oers products alone, the
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Figure 3: Service Bundling Strategies and Unit Service Capacity Cost
other rm prefers to oer bundles since <B;P>1 = 
<P;B>
2 > 
<P;P>
1 = 
<P;P>
2 ; while if any
rm oers bundles, the other rm would not like to oer products alone to customers because
<P;B>1 = 
<B;P>
2 > 
<B;B>
1 = 
<B;B>
2 . Thus, the nal equilibrium turns out to be (B, B), and
two rms' prots are equal, i.e., <B;B>1 = 
<B;B>
2 .
5 Numerical Studies
In this section, we report the results of our numerical studies, in which we investigate the eects of
service sensitivity, rms dierence, market size and service requirement rate on the nal equilibrium.
In these numerical studies, the model parameters are set to the following unless otherwise stated:
cv = 1, k = 3, t = 1, M = 9, n = 10 and W = 1.
5.1 Impact of the service sensitivity
To understand the eect of service sensitivity parameter k on the nal equilibrium strategy, we
illustrate the relationship between 1, 2 and k in Figure 4. We can observe that as k increases,
1 increases and 2 decreases. Besides, there are two threshold values k
 and k of the service
level sensitivity such that: (i) when the service level sensitivity is low (k < k), 1 < 0 and 2 > 0,
both rms oer products alone to customers, and the nal equilibrium strategy is (P, P); (ii) when
the service level sensitivity is moderately high (k < k < k), 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, only one rm
oers bundles and the other rm oers products, and the nal equilibrium is (B, P) or (P, B); (iii)
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Figure 4: Service Bundling Strategies and Sensitivity of Service
when the service level sensitivity is high (k > k), 1 > 0 and 2 < 0, both rms oer bundles,
and the nal equilibrium is (B, B). As k refers to the importance of service to customers, it is easy
to understand that when k increases, oering bundles becomes a more competitive choice. This
result is very intuitive. When we consider products such as shoes, it is not likely that the sensitivity
to shoes maintenance service is high for many consumers, and we seldom see shoes companies oer
maintenance service bundles. Besides, we can observe that (B, B) or (P, P) are the nal equilibrium
strategies for a wide range of parameter values.
5.2 Impact of the rms dierence
We test the relationship between 1, 2 and the dierence parameter t under dierent parameter
space of unit service capacity cost cv. The results are presented in Figure 5.
It can be observed from all plots in Figure 5 that both 1 and 2 are decreasing in t, and
the decreasing speed gradually slows down. Since t represents the dierence between two rms'
products, as t increases, there are less intensive competition between the two rms, thus the prots
of two rms depend more on their own cost structure and the value of products. Hence, both
1 and 2 converge to a stable value as t increases. Furthermore, plot(a) shows the relationship
between 1, 2 and t when the unit service capacity cost is low (cv < c

v). As t increases, 1 and
2 decrease, but 1 remains positive and 2 remains negative. Thus the nal equilibrium is still
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Figure 5: Service Bundling Strategies and Firms Dierence
(B, B). Plot(b) shows the relationship between 1, 2 and t when the unit service capacity cost
is moderately low (cv < cv < cv ). As t increases, 1 decreases from a positive value to a negative
value, while 2 remains positive. The nal equilibrium changes from (B, P) to (B, B). When the
unit service capacity cost is moderately high (cv < cv < cv ), e.g. see plot(c), 1 decreases from a
positive value to a negative value, while 2 keeps positive. The nal strategy equilibrium changes
from (B, P) to (P, P). In plot(d), where the unit service capacity cost is high (cv > c

v ), as t
increases, 1 and 2 decrease, but 1 remains negative and 2 remains positive, and the nal
equilibrium (P, P) does not change.
Figure 5 indicates that as t increases, the nal strategy equilibrium is more likely to be (B, B)
or (P, P) than (B, P). As the dierence between two rms' products reduces the competition, both
rms tend to be more like monopolies. Thus they are more likely to take the same strategy due to
the symmetric structure. In consistent with the observations in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2, (B, B)
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and (P, P) are the nal equilibrium strategies for a wide range of parameter values.
5.3 Impact of the market size
The relationship between 1, 2 and the market size M is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6 shows that as M increases, 1 increases and 2 decreases. We can observe that there
are two threshold values M and M of the market size such that: (i) when the market size is
small (M < M), 1 < 0 and 2 > 0, both rms oer products alone to customers, and the nal
equilibrium strategy is (P, P); (ii) when the market size is moderately big (M < M < M),
1 > 0 and 2 > 0, one rm oers bundles and the other rm oers products alone to customers,
the nal equilibrium is (B, P) or (P, B); (iii) when the market size is relatively big (M > M),
1 > 0 and 2 < 0, both rms oer bundles to customers, and the nal equilibrium is (B, B).
These observations are easy to understand: as the market size increases, the xed cost for the
service capacity can be shared by more customers, thus both rms have more incentives to oer
bundles.
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5.4 Impacts of service requirements arrival rate
Note that the customers'service requirements arrival rate i is proportional to the demand Di and
1
n
is the average usage rate of all customers. We can check the impacts of service rate by checking
the impacts of n. The relationship between 1, 2 and the service requirement rate n is shown in
Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Service Bundling Strategies and Service Requirement Rate
Figure 7 shows that 1 is increasing in n and 2 is decreasing in n. Besides, we can observe:
when n is low, 1 < 0 and 2 > 0, both rms oer products alone to customers; when n is
moderately high, 1 > 0 and 2 > 0, only one rm oers bundles and the other rm oers
products; when n is high, 1 > 0 and 2 < 0, both rms oer bundles. These observations are
intuitive. As 1=n determines the service arrival rate, when n is small, customers are more likely
to ask for service requirement. In this situation, bundles providers have to invest more on service
facility, which leads to a high service cost. Thus rms are less likely to oer service bundles. For
example, we seldom see auto companies provide car washing service bundles.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies the service bundling strategies of two rms in a competing environment. First,
we analyze the optimal price and service level decisions under dierent sub-games. We nd that
a rm will oer a higher service level and charge a higher price when only one rm oers bundles
compared to the case when both two rms oer bundles. Second, we show that as the market size
increases, the bundles providers intend to oer a higher service level due to the scale economy of
service capacity investment. Third, we characterize the market conditions in which only one rm,
or both rms oer od do not oer P&S bundles. We nd that in equilibrium, whether rms would
like to oer bundles or products alone depends on the cost structure of the service and customers'
sensitivity to service. Our analysis also shows that when the service capacity cost is relatively low
(high), both rms oer bundles (products alone) to customers; when the service capacity cost is
moderately large, only one rm oers bundles and the other rm oers products alone. Finally,
we conduct several numerical experiments to show the impacts of dierent parameters on the nal
equilibrium strategy. Our results suggest that oering bundles becomes a more competitive choice
for both rms when customers' sensitivity to service is high or market size is large.
The model can be further extended in our future work. We assume that all customers' sensitivity
to the service are the same, i.e., k is indierent between customers. Relaxing this assumption may
lead to more insights and interesting observations. Furthermore, we do not consider the competition
in the service market. As the rapid growth in the outsourcing industry provides more market gain
for companies oering additional service, our future research could also investigate the competition
between bundles providers and the third service providers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
For equations (11) and (12), using rst order conditions, we can get:
@<B;P>1
@W1
=  1
9
3kM (W2)
2 t  k2M (W2)3 + k2M (W2)2W1   9cvt
(W2)
2 t
= 0 (31)
@<B;P>2
@W2
=  1
9
3kM (W1)
2 t  k2M (W1)3 + k2M (W1)2W2   9cvt
(W1)
2 t
= 0: (32)
By solving the above equations, we obtain (W1  W2)

W1

3t
k
 W2

+W1

3t
k
 W2

= 0.
From condition W <
3t
k
, we get W1

3t
k
 W2

+W1

3t
k
 W2

> 0. Thus W1  W2 = 0. By
subtracting W1 = W2 into (31) and (32), we can derive the equilibrium solutions: W
<B;P>
1 =
W<B;P>1 =
r
3cv
kM
. By substituting W<B;P>1 and W
<B;P>
1 into (2), (9), (10), (11) and (12), we
can derive other equilibrium solutions . 
Proof of Lemma 1
Let G(x) = x2
 
3t  cv
n
k
+ W   x
!
, we have G(0) = 0 <
9cvt
Mk2
. From the condition k
 
W  r
3cv
kM
!
 cv
n
, we have W   cv
kn

r
3cv
kM
, thus G(W   cv
kn
) =

W   cv
kn
2 3t
k
>
9cvt
Mk2
. In
addition, G(x) is a continuous function, hence we can conclude that there exists at least one
solution in
h
0;W   cv
kn
i
for equation (1).
For the uniqueness, by using condition
3t
k
> W , we have:
G0(x) = 2
0@3t  cvn
k
+W
1Ax  x2 > 22W   cv
kn

x  x2 > 0, 8 x 2
h
0;W   cv
kn
i
.
Thus G(x) is monotonic increasing in
h
0;W   cv
kn
i
, which guarantees the uniqueness of solution.

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Proof of Corollary 1:
From Lemma 1, we know that W<B;P>1 is a function of cv, which is determined by equation (26).
By dierentiating both sides of equation (26) with respect to cv, we have:
@W<B;P>1
@cv
=
kM

W<B;P>1
2
+ 9tn
kMW<B;P>1

 3nkW<B;P>1 + 2nkW + 6tn  2cv
 (33)
Rewriting the denominator of the right hand side of equation (33), we have:
 3nkW<B;P>1 + 2nkW + 6tn  2cv
= tn
 
 3kW<B;P>1
t
+
2kW
t
+ 6  2cv
tn
!
> tn
 
2cv
tn
  2kW
<B;P>
1
t
+ 6  2cv
tn
!
> tn

6  2kW
t

> 0
Where the rst inequality follows from condition k
 
W  W1

>
cv
n
, the second one from
W<B;P>1 < W and the last one from W <
3t
k
. Thus we have
@W<B;P>1
@cv
> 0.
The results of
@W<B;P>1
@t
> 0,
@W<B;P>1
@k
< 0 and
@W<B;P>1
@M
> 0 can be abtained following
similar logic. 
Proof of Corollary 2:
From the conditionW<B;P>1 2
h
0;W   cv
kn
i
, we have 1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
 1. AsW<B;P>1
is the solution of equation (26), thus we have

W<B;P>1
2
=
3cvt
kM
1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
 3cvt
kM
=

W<B;B>1
2
which leads to W<B;P>1 W<B;B>1 . 
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Proof of Corollary 3:
As p<B;P>1 = c+ t+
2cv
3n
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
, by dierentiating p<B;P>1 with respect to k, we have:
@p<B;P>1
@k
=
W  W<B;P>1
3t
 
k
 
@W<B;P>1
@k
!
3t
From Corollary 1, we have
@W<B;P>1
@k
< 0, hence
@p<B;P>1
@k
> 0.
The proof of
@p<B;P>2
@k
< 0 and
@p<B;P>2
@cv
> 0 can be show following similar logic. 
Proof of Corollary 4:
It is easy to see that p<B;B>1 = p
<B;B>
2 > p
<P;P>
1 = p
<P;P>
2 . From Corollary 2 we know
W<B;P>1  W<B;B>1 . Using condition k

W  W<B;B>1

>
cv
n
, we have k

W  W<B;P>1


k

W  W<B;B>1

>
cv
n
. Thus we have p<B;P>1 = c+ t+
2cv
3n
+
k
 
W  W<B;P>1
!
3t
> c+ t+
cv
n
=
p<B;B>1 and p
<B;P>
2 = c+ t+
cv
3n
 
k
 
W  W<B;P>1
!
3t
> c+ t = p<B;B>2 . 
From the assumption k
 
W  
r
3cv
kM
!
 cv
n
, we can see that cv 2 [0; cv].
Proof of Corollary 5:
From equation (17), we can see that:
D<B;P>1 =
"
k(W  W<B;P>1 )
3
  cv
3n
+ t
#
M
2t
:
From Lemma 1, we have W<B;P>1 < W  
cv
kn
. Thus D<B;P>1 
M
2
, and D<B;P>2 = M  
D<B;P>1 
M
2
. Since we have D<B;B>1 = D
<B;B>
2 > D
<P;P>
1 = D
<P;P>
2 , thus the result holds.
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Proof of Lemma 2
From Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we further rewrite 1 (cv) and 2 (cv) as follows:
1 (cv) =
Mt
2
241  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
352   cv
W<B;P>1
  Mt
2
(34)
2 (cv) =
Mt
2
241 + cv
3nt
 
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
352   Mt
2
 
r
cvkM
3
!
(35)
Proof of Lemma 2-(i)
To prove Lemma 2-(i), it is sucient to prove that 1 (cv) is increasing in cv, (ii) 1 (0) > 0 and
1 (cv) < 0. Firstly, we prove that 1 (cv) is increasing in cv. Evaluating the derivatives of 1 (cv)
with respect to cv we have the following equations:
@1 (cv)
@cv
=Mt
"
1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
# 
  1
3nt
 
k
@W<B;P>1
@cv
3t
!
+
cv
@W<B;P>1
@cv
W<B;P>1
2  1
W<B;P>1
=
"
Mt
0@1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
1A  k
3t

+
cv
W<B;P>1
2
#
@W<B;P>1
@cv
+Mt
"
1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
#
  1
3nt

  1
W<B;P>1
As Mt
"
1  cv
3nt
+
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
#
  k
3t

+
cv
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2 = 0, thus we have
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
  1
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which shows that 1 (cv) is monotonic decreasing in cv.
Now we prove that 1 (0) > 0 and 1 (cv) < 0. It can be directly found that 1(0) =
Mt
2
"
1 +
k

W  W<B;P>1

3t
#2
  Mt
2
> 0. For 1 (cv), as cv is the solution of k
 
W  
r
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27
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, by solving the equation
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= 0, we can get
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r
3cv
kM
. Subscribing W<B;P>1 into equation (34), and we get 1 (cv) =  
r
cvkM
3
< 0.
Furthermore, as 1 (cv) is a continuous function, we can conclude that Lemma2-(i) holds.
Besides, we can see that cv is the value where 1 (cv ) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2-(ii)
To prove Lemma 2-(i), we rst show that 2 (cv) is increasing in cv, and then show that 2 (0) < 0
and 2 (cv) > 0.
From equation (26), we can see that 1   cv
3nt
+
k
 
W  W<B;P>1
!
3t
> 0. Combined with the
condition
@W<B;P>1
@cv
from Corollary 2, we can nd that
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is
increasing in cv.
Using the similar logic in the proof of Lemma2-(i), we can also prove: 2 (0) =
Mt
2
"
1  
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
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
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2
< 0 and 2 (cv) =
r
cvkM
3
> 0.
As 2 (cv) is a continuous function, thus we can conclude that Lemma 2-(ii) holds. So the result
of Lemma 2-(ii) follows. And we can see that cv is the value where 2 (cv) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2-(iii)
From proof of Lemma 2-(i) we know that 1 (cv) is monotonic decreasing in cv and 1 (c

v ) = 0.
Thus to prove cv  cv , it is sucient to prove that 1 (cv) > 1 (cv ) = 0.
Let S(cv) =
k

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
3t
  cv
3nt
. Using condition W<B;P>1 2

0;W   cv
kn
i
and W <
3t
k
,
we can see that S(cv) 2 (0; 1]. Hence 1 (cv) and 2 (cv) can be simplied as
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And the equation (26) can be simplied as
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= 0, which leads to
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v) is derived by:
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3
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As we know cv is the value where 2 (cv) = 0, we have 2 (cv) =
Mt
2

S(cv)2   2S(cv)

+r
cvkM
3
= 0, in turn
r
cvkM
3
=
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. Thus (36) can be rewritten as:
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If (S(cv) + 2) > (2  S(cv))
p
[1 + S(cv)], then 1 (cv) > 0 holds. As S(cv) 2 (0; 1], we square
both sides of the inequality and get:
4 + 4S(cv) + S(c

v)
2 > 4  3S(cv)2 + S(cv)3 (37)
(37) obviously holds as S(cv) 2 (0; 1]. Thus we have 1 (cv) > 0 = 1 (cv ). As 1 (cv) is increasing
in cv for cv 2 (0; 1], combined with conditions cv 2 (0; cv] and cv 2 [0; cv], we can conclude that
cv < cv .
So the results of Lemma 2 follow. 
Proof of Proposition 5
The results of Proposition 5 can be directly deduced from Lemma 2. 
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